Corporate financial structure and the funding of private pension plans

One strand of the literature on the employment contract focuses on the role of the contract in the efficient sharing of risk between capitalists and workers. One way capitalists can shift risk to workers is to provide part of workers' remuneration in the form of an unfunded, deferred pension. Since bonds, in the event of bankruptcy or voluntary termination, are typically senior to unfunded pension liabilities, capitalists can also affect their risk by altering the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. These observations suggest that corporate financial structure and the employment contract are interdependent. The paper has two major goals. The first is to take a step towards integrating the theory of corporate financial structure with that of the employment contract. The second is to investigate possible consequences of legislation which regulates the funding of private pensions.     

Regulated firms in pollution permit markets with banking

This paper examines a competitive intertemporal market for bankable emission permits, such as sulfur dioxide allowances. Without profit regulation, firms are willing to bank permits if permit prices rise over time with the rate of interest, but will not bank if prices rise more slowly.The market achieves aggregate emission targets at least total cost if there is no profit regulation, but may not do so if firms are subject to profit regulation. Firms must arbitrage differences both in abatement cost and in the regulatory treatment of permits to achieve least total cost.The impetus for this work came from research we initiated during the Summer of 1990 for the Energy Information Agency. We would like to thank Chuck Howe for his detailed comments and enthusiasm, and Jim Alm, Dave Bjornstad, Charles deBartolome, Mike Greenwood, Robert Hahn, Douglas Hale, Carolyn Lang, Jim Markusen, Edward Morey, Till Requate, and Tom Tietenberg. We are grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for stressing the importance of regulation in these markets and for their helpful and clarifying advice.     

Adoption of improved irrigation and drainage reduction technologies under limiting environmental conditions

Modern irrigation technologies have been suggested as a means of conserving scarce water and reducing environmental pollution caused by irrigated agriculture. This paper applies an economic model of technology selection that provides a general framework to analyzing adoption of irrigation technologies under various environmental conditions. Data from the San Joaquin Valley of California is used to verify the theoretical relationships. Results suggest key variables to be considered by policy makers concerned with adoption of modern irrigation technologies. Among these variables are crop prices, water technology costs, farm organization characteristics, and the environmental conditions of the farm or the field. Policy implications were discussed and analyzed.This research was conducted while the first author was a visiting scholar with the Dept. of Agricultural Economics, University of California, Davis, and USDA-ERS, USA.     

Voting on meritocracy

This paper considers a setting where a resource such as education budget is to be distributed among agents. The latter differ in their ability to make use of the resource, and the issue is that of determining the allocation rule whereby the individual shares of the resource (may) depend on their relative efforts of obtaining it. The paper's focus is on endogenous determination, through voting, of the degree of meritocracy in the resource allocation system, which determines the marginal productivity of one's effort. It is found that a meritocratic system is expected to be supported by highly productive individuals and opposed by those with low productivity. When the decision making becomes less elitist and involves broader participation of population groups the support for meritocracy decreases.     

The dynamics of inter-firm networks in the course of the industry life cycle: the role of appropriability

This paper examines the dynamics of inter-firm networks and introduces a conceptual framework for explaining why inter-firm networks change over time. The framework is based on the idea that patterns of inter-firm linkages are linked to the life cycle development of an industry. Special emphasis is placed on the role of appropriabiliy, i.e. a firm's ability to capture the profits generated by its innovations. The (trans)formation of inter-firm networks in three industries is examined and used to illustrate the relevance of the framwork. One important inference from our study is that public policy makers and manageers should take into account the phase of industry development before implementing policies to create and/or change inter-firm networks.     

Should trees have managerial standing? Toward stakeholder status for non-human nature

Most definitions of the concept of stakeholder include only human entities. This paper advances the argument that the non-human natural environment can be integrated into the stakeholder management concept. This argument includes the observations that the natural environment is finally becoming recognized as a vital component of the business environment, that the stakeholder concept is more than a human political/economic one, and that non-human nature currently is not adequately represented by other stakeholder groups. In addition, this paper asserts that any of several stakeholder management processes can readily include the natural environment as one or more stakeholders of organizations. Finally, the point is made that this integration would provide a more holistic, value-oriented, focused and strategic approach to stakeholder management, potentially benefitting both nature and organizations.Mark Starik is an Assistant Professor of Strategic Management and Public Policy at The George Washington University. His research and writing on environmental management topics include articles, chapters, and presentations on Global Strategic Environmental Management, Environmental Entrepreneurship, and Environmental Stakeholders of the U.S. Energy Sector. In addition, he is active in the advancement of environmental programs in both the Academy of Management and the George Washington University.     

Stores

Summary There is scope and incentive for stores to endogenously arise in an exchange economy when agents possess different levels of bargaining power and coalition formation is costly. In the absence of stores, agents face a trading lottery where the expected outcome for an individual agent depends upon his relative bargaining strength. By setting appropriate, preannounced prices, a store can profitably offer relatively weak bargainers trading opportunities which they prefer to the trading lottery. While relatively weak bargainers are attracted to the store, relatively strong bargainers prefer the trading lottery to the store. Thus, the simultaneous existence of barter and mediated trade is explained.The work reported here was conceived while both authors were visiting the University of Southern California. We thank Martine Quinzii and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Finance, Politics, and the Accounting for Stock Options

The politics of option accounting crosses party lines, reflecting both the interests of the affected constituencies and the desire for power over standard setting. House Bill HR-3574, which mandates an assumption of zero stock price volatility, runs counter to the recently passed Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rule requiring fair-value expensing of stock options. For any option issued at or out of the money, where strike prices are normally set, expense recognition is zero under this bill's mandated assumption.
Besides excessive use of stock options, the lack of a "final peace" in the option accounting war appears to have encouraged another questionable corporate practice. This article examines a sample of "six-and-one restructurings," exchanges of options in which expensing of re-priced (deep out-of-the-money) options can be avoided if employees wait at least six months and one day before receiving new options. The authors found that market-adjusted stock prices tend to decrease during the six-month period before the strike price is reset. This result provides one more reason why companies should be required to use fair-value option pricing models to expense options.     

An Isomorphism Between Asset Pricing Models With and Without Linear Habit Formation

We show an isomorphism between optimal portfolio selection orcompetitive equilibrium models with utilities incorporatinglinear habit formation, and corresponding models without habitformation. The isomorphism can be used to mechanically transformknown solutions not involving habit formation to correspondingsolutions with habit formation. For example, the Constantinides(1990) and Ingersoll (1992) solutions are mechanically obtainedfrom the familiar Merton solutions for the additive utilitycase, without recourse to a Bellman equation or first-orderconditions. More generally, recent solutions to portfolio selectionproblems with recursive utility and a stochastic investmentopportunity set are readily transformed to novel solutions ofcorresponding problems with utility that combines recursivitywith habit formation. The methodology also applies in the contextof Hindy–Huang–Kreps (1992) preferences, where ourisomorphism shows that the solution obtained by Hindy and Huang(1993) can be mechanically transformed to Dybvig's (1995) solutionto the optimal consumption-investment problem with consumptionratcheting.